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IV. MUST CONGRESS END THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA? A CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

HOST: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Steve
Cook, and I am the Managing Editor of the American University Law
Review. I am pleased to be able to take you through the remaining
events of the day.
As a law school located in the District of Columbia, obviously we take
great interest in issues involving the District. We are therefore
especially pleased to host this important discussion regarding what role
the District should have in our democracy.
Professor Gillette has illuminated the anomalous situation the
District is in, and we have heard our first panelists discuss the nature of
the right to vote and our Constitution. With that background, we are
now ready to begin a debate over whether Congress can and should
remove one of the anomalies found in the District, and that is the
disenfranchisement of District citizens.
We are honored to have ten of the most respected and outspoken
advocates on both sides of this issue with us here today serving as
judges. They will later participate in a panel discussion in which they
discuss the arguments presented by our debaters today.
Three of the six judges who will be presiding over this debate are
sitting to my left. Beginning on my left is Mr. Steven Valentine, who is
former Deputy Attorney General of the United States. To his left is
Professor Anthony Farley of the Boston College School of Law.
To his left is Professor David Kairys of the Temple University School
of Law. Sitting at the table to my right, and beginning on my right, is
Professor Peter Raven-Hansen of the George Washington University
Law School.
To his right, Professor Mark Niles of the American University,
Washington College of Law. To his right, Mr. Todd Cox, who is
Assistant Counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.
These six judges, as I mentioned, will be the participants in our panel
discussion this afternoon. At that time, they will discuss the arguments
presented by the debaters today.
The panel discussion also will provide an opportunity for members of
the audience to make any comments or ask any questions of the
panelists, and we would ask you to reserve your comments until that
time.
The format for the debate will be as follows: Each debater will have
twelve minutes to present their argument, beginning with the
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proponents of allowing voting representation for the District residents,
and then alternating to the opponents of congressional action. After all
four have argued their positions, a representative from each side will
have an opportunity to present a six minute rebuttal.
Arguing in favor of congressional action to provide voting
representation are ProfessorJamie Raskin, to my immediate right, and
Professor Paul Butler. We would like to especially thank Professor
Butler for filling in for Congresswoman Norton. She had to chair a
subcommittee hearing today in Congress, and will be joining us later
this afternoon.
Jamie Raskin is a professor of law at the American University
Washington College of Law. Professor Raskin is the former Assistant
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and served
as General Counsel to the National Rainbow Coalition under Jesse
Jackson. He served on President Clinton's Transition Team in 1992
working on civil rights.
Professor Raskin's forthcoming article, "Is This America: The District
of Columbia and the Right to Vote," will be published in the Harvard
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review in the winter. That article
helped trigger the current legal effort to end the disenfi-anchisement of
District citizens.
Professor Paul Butler is a law professor at George Washington
University and has served in the U.S. Department of Justice. Professor
Butler has published in several law journals on topics dealing with race
and crime. He writes a monthly column for Legal Times about local
government issues.
Arguing against congressional action are judge Stephen Markman, to
Professor Butler's right, and Professor Adam Kurland. Judge Markman
is currently ajudge on the Michigan Court of Appeals. Prior to being
appointed to the bench, he served as Assistant Attorney General of the
United States. It was in this office that he authored the 1987 attorney
general report addressing the question of statehood for the District of
Columbia.
Professor Kurland is a professor of law at Howard University and has
written extensively on criminal law issues and constitutional issues
concerning the District of Columbia, including an article in the George
Washington University Law Review entitled, "Partisan Rhetoric,
Constitutional Reality, and Political Responsibility: The Troubling
Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C. Statehood by Simple
Legislation."
Professor Mark Niles, sitting in front of me, will moderate the debate.
Professor Niles.
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PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Let us begin with Professor
Raskin.
PROFESSOR RASKIN: I am going to take a second to thank the Law
Review for organizing this conference, and all of the participants for
your very serious contributions here today.
I owe a special thanks to my friend Gary Peller from Georgetown Law
School who has characteristically preempted the left position and
managed to position me squarely in the center of this debate, where I
like to be. I do wholeheartedly disagree with him about one point.
This case is not an uphill battle in any sense. I think it is a winner if we
follow the whole trajectory of our constitutional history.
President Lincoln spoke of government of the people, by the people,
and for the people.88 Yet this foundational principle lays in tatters today
in Washington. For here we have a community of more than half
million people, loyal taxpaying, "draftable" American citizens who have
no voting representation in the United States House of Representatives
and no voting representation in the United States Senate.
If Congress moves to try to impeach President Clinton, the people of
Washington will be the only community in the United States which will
have participated in the election of President Clinton and yet will have
no say whatsoever in either the impeachment or the trial or conviction
of President Clinton. It is a complete shutout.
As with congressional votes on the federal budget and taxes, issues of
war and peace, foreign policy, the confirmation of Supreme Court
justices who are going to sit on the D.C. voting rights case, federal
judges, as well as the D.C. budget and other local issues, American
citizens living in Washington are totally disenfranchised and at the
mercy of other people's representatives. This political tyranny will have
been going on for two centuries as of the year 2000.
So here is the constitutional question:
Are the hundreds of
thousands of American citizens living in D.C. part of "We the People,"89
the sovereign community that created the United States and that is the
continuing source of all legitimate democratic authority, or are they
outside of the democratic community?
Are Washingtonians first class citizens entitled to all of the
constitutional rights enjoyed by other American citizens? Or are
American citizens living in Washington entitled only to some rights and
subject to the decision making of other people's representatives? Do
the commands of equal protection and one person, one vote apply to
88. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in I DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 429 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. 1973).
89. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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citizens living in D.C., or do voting and participatory rights stop at the
border?
There are two diametrically opposed ways of looking at these
questions. There is what I will call the "straighjacket view" of the
Constitution, and there is what I will call the "freedom charter" view.
The straighJacket view is second nature to most of us, for we have
internalized its assumptions. I will include myself, for I did not really
open my eyes on the issue until last year when I began to look at the
history myself and look at the cases as stepping stones to justice for
Washington.
The straighjacket view is well captured by Judge Markman's
extremely well written but totally wrongheaded discussion of D.C.
statehood and the voting rights issue in the Report to the Attorney General
on the Question of Statehoodfor the District of Columbia.9°
The argument runs like this. I will synopsize it briefly and let him
elaborate it. Because of the District Clause and our history, the rights of
political participation enjoyed by other citizens simply do not and
cannot apply to American citizens who live in D.C., who are governed
directly by a Congress they may neverjoin.
Under Article I, as Professor Gardner foreshadowed for us, the
argument is that representation in Congress belongs exclusively to
American citizens living in "the states." The Constitution and the
nation were created by the states. It is a compact among them. No
interloper, like the District of Columbia, may interfere in the states'
compact.
Congress, according to Judge Markman, cannot even redraw the
boundaries of the District to admit a new state or even to retrocede the
land to Maryland because the borders of the District, the seat of
government, have been fixed and frozen. So there is simply no way that
D.C. residents can be represented in the House and Senate, certainly
no duty for Congress to make it happen.
The fact that there is taxation without representation, conscription
without representation, is irrelevant because as Judge Markman writes,
District residents pay only those taxes paid by all other citizens of the
United States.
Furthermore, he writes, District residents have voluntarily exchanged
their vote for the privilege of living in the nation's capital. To reclaim
it, he says, they need only move.
The fact that District residents are locked out presents no real
90.

See OFFICE OF LEGAL PoucY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
(1987) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GEN.

THE QUESTION OF STATEHOOD FOR THE Dismrer OF COLUMBIA
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problem for democracy, for as Judge Markman writes, "[I]t is difficult
to seriously maintain that the residents of the District of Columbia have
no voice in the national government. In fact, because of their
proximity to the center of power, they have far more influence than the
average American."9' He explains, "District residents, while lacking a
vote, have far more opportunities of contact with Members of Congress
than the average state citizen who elects them."9 According to this
view, nothing can be done, nothing must be done, and certainly
nothing should be done because disenfranchised Washingtonians
already have more power than all other American citizens.
Now I want to suggest a radically different interpretation. It begins
with a different reading of history. Our nation was conceived in
insurgency and revolution against a king who denied Americans the
vote.
King George argued that Americans enjoyed virtual
representation; that is, they were virtually represented by the English
lords who would keep their interests in mind.
The Americans rejected that nonsense.
The Declaration of
Independence stated that governments justly derived their powers only
from the consent of the governed directly, and noted that Great Britain
had violated that requirement by forcing our people to "relinquish the
Right of Representation in the Legislature, a Right inestimable to
them."93
When the Constitution was written, it was not the states but "We the
People of the United States" who secured the blessings of liberty to
their "posterity."" The District of Columbia did not exist in 1787, and
the people who lived on the land that we stand on today were part of
the constitutional people who wrote the Constitution and bequeathed
liberty to their posterity.
AsJustice Sutherland wrote in ODonoghue v. United State 5 in 1933,
[t]he District had been a part of the states of Maryland and
Virginia. It had been subject to the Constitution and was a part
of the United States. The Constitution
attached to it
irrevocably. There are steps which can never be taken
backwards. The mere cession of the district to the federal
government relinquished the authority of the states, but it did
not take it out of the United States or from under the aegis of
the Constitution.
Neither party ever consented to that construction. The District still
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

ATrORNEYGEN. REP., supra note 90, at 46.
Id.
THE DEcLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.5 (U.S. 1776).
U.S. CONSr. pmbl.
289 U.S. 516 (1933).
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remained a part of the United States protected by the Constitution.
With the District Clause, the Framers did not intend to
disenfranchise anyone. The clause says nothing about voting. The
purpose of it was to guarantee Congress police power, military
jurisdiction over the seat of government to assure that the government
would be safe in its dealings from foreign invaders and local mobs.
But none of the Framers intended for anyone to lose their
representation. This fact is dramatically borne out by the history. For
residents of the congressionally controlled district continued to vote for
representatives in the House and Senate from Maryland and Virginia
between 1791 and 1800. This is decisive, contemporaneous refutation
of the proposition that the Constitution necessarily implied the
disenfranchisement of people who lived in the capital city.
Indeed, amazingly to modem eyes, there were even representatives
from Maryland and Virginia who lived exclusively in the District. Daniel
Carroll, who lived in Rock Creek Park, served in both the Continental
Congress and the first U.S. Congress from 1789 to 1791 as a
representative from Maryland.9 After 1800 John Love, a resident of
Alexandria, which was part of the District, served in the 10th and 11th
Congresses as a representative from Virginia from 1807 to 1811.97
So neither text nor history supports the weight of the proposition
that the Constitution compels disenfranchisement. At this point then,
the question simply becomes whether there is a right to vote and be
represented that is being violated, and whether Congress must act to
vindicate it.
Contrary to the straightjacket theory, two centuries of case law tell us
that the District is not a constitution-free zone. In fact, the Constitution
applies with full force here. Congress cannot establish a church.
Congress cannot shut down the newspapers in the District. Congress
cannot deny the right to ajury trial. Nor can it deny people the right to
due process of law.
Equal protection applies with full force here. In 1954, when the
Supreme Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education,8 it also
handed down Boiing v. Sharpe,9 which struck down separate but equal
schools in the District. The government had made the argument that
even if school segregation is unconstitutional in the states, that is only
in the states because the Fourteenth Amendment says that no state shall
96. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIREGrORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989, at 748 (US.
Government Printing Office, Bicentennial ed. 1989).
97. See id. at 1393.
98. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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deprive any person of equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court
rejected that restrictive interpretation in Bolling v. Sharpe. It would be
unthinkable, said the Court, that one standard of equal protection
would apply to the people of the states and another to the people of the
District.
Ten years later, the Court declared the equal protection principle
that has come to define American democracy in our century: One
person, one vote. In Wesberry v. Sanders,'° the Court struck down
malapportioned congressional districts, holding that the vote of all
citizens must be of equal weight. Justice Black wrote, "No right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of
people in any way that unnecessarily abridges this right.''0
The same year, in Reynolds v. Sims,'02 the Court struck down
malapportioned legislative districts in Alabama. Chief Justice Warren
said that citizens may not be deprived of votes based on where they live.
Weighting the votes of citizens differently by any method or means
merely because of where they happen to reside hardly seems justifiable.
He elaborated, "Representation schemes once fair and equitable
become archaic and outdated. But the basic principle of representative
government remains, and must remain, unchanged-the weight of a
citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives .... The
Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state
legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all
03
races."'
The principle of one person, one vote is so critical today that you
cannot vary the population size of districts even one half of one
percent. Just three weeks ago, the Democrats and Republicans from
the House were in court fighting about census sampling.' 4 The
Democrats said counting every citizen is so important that we should
use census sampling to make sure we get it right. The Republicans said
no; it is so important that we have to count each person physically.
Regardless of which method is better, both parties agreed that we
have to count every person. But right in front of the noses of both the
Democrats and the Republicans in the House, we have hundreds of
100. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
101. Id at 17.
102. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
103. Id at 567-68.
104. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Department of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d. 76 (1998)
(prohibiting the use ofstatistical sampling in conducting the census), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999).
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thousands of American citizens who are present and accounted for, and
yet, not apportioned and not represented for purposes of
representation.
Now perhaps you agree that the Constitution applies, equal
protection applies, but contend that the right to vote certainly can't
apply because Congress governs the District. But the Supreme Court
rejected that argument in 1970 in Evans v. Comman.'05 There the Court
struck down Maryland's disenfranchisement of U.S. citizens living on
the NIH campus in Montgomery County in Maryland, a few miles from
here.'9
Maryland had argued that because Congress governs under Article I,
Section Eight, Clause Seventeen (which is the same place where the
District Clause is found), American citizens living there lost their
democratic right to vote and participate in federal elections. But the
Court rejected the claim that the federal character of the NIH campus
terminated Maryland's obligations to grant citizens the right to vote.
Maryland was "breaking the citizens' link to his laws and government,
the link that is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges," the
Court said. 7
So just as with the NIH in Rockville, strict scrutiny must apply here in
Washington, D.C. There are no compelling interests or reasons for
denying people the right to vote. Or if there are, I would like to see our
worthy adversaries state what they are, and then we can analyze the
strength of their claims.
The D.C. Corporation Counsel filed suit against disenfranchisement
on September 14th. 0'8 We believe the Court must declare the current
regime unlawful. It can give Congress the chance to remedy the
situation with all deliberate speed. But if it doesn't, the Court itself
must order relief, just as it has done in the one person, one vote cases,
just as it is done in the majority-minority voting district cases. We say
that the most logical remedy is to have direct representation of the
District in Congress as if it were a state.
Now you say that means that Eleanor Holmes Norton and-I don't
know-Paul Butler could be U.S. Senators just like Jesse Helms and
Strom Thurmond can be senators? The answer is yes, that is absolutely
right. The District is treated presently as though it were a state for more
than 500 purposes by the Congress of the United States.
The most familiar tag line you see in any federal statute is, "For the
105. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
106. Seeid.
107. IL at 422.
108. SeeAlexanderv. Daley, 26 F. Supp. 2d 156 (1998).
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purposes of this statute, state includes the District of Columbia." It is
treated as a state for constitutional purposes as well.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Districtjudgments are treated with
full faith and credit by the states and vice versa. The Diversity
Jurisdiction Clause: citizens of the District are treated as citizens of a
state for the purposes of suing across state lines and invoking federal
jurisdiction. There are other plausible remedies as well, including the
Maryland-based voting option.
But direct representation is the sensible, the elegant, and the
constitutionally compelling solution to the problem of disenfranchisement in Washington, D.C.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Judge Markman.
JUDGE MARKMAN: Thank you. I too would like to thank American
University for sponsoring this conference.
I would like to thank
Professor Raskin in particular for his intellectual efforts which have
culminated in this conference, although, one hopes, not in a successful
lawsuit.
With respect to several of the comments attributed to me by Professor
Raskin, let me correct the record and note that, by and large, these are
quotations from James Madison. But I am honored nevertheless by the
association.
Article II, Section Five of the United States Constitution provides that
no person shall be eligible to serve as President who has not attained
the age of thirty-five years. Several years ago, I recall, there was a
constitutional scholar who argued that this language really did not
mean that a President had to be at least thirty-five years old, but merely
that he had to have reached an age reflecting a maturity level
compatible with the maturity level reflected by thirty-five years of age in
1787 when the founders drafted the Constitution.' 9 Perhaps that
equivalent age today was something less or something more than thirtyfive years.
I recall this analysis because once again it appears that there is no
language in our Constitution that is sufficiently clear that it cannot be
rendered unclear by a creative and determined scholar, there are
apparently no barriers to governmental conduct that are anything more
than "parchment barriers," awaiting deconstruction by an innovative
professor of law.
In the case at hand, of course, the language is that of Article I,

109. SeeAnthony D'Amato, Aspects ofDeconstrution: The
Nw. U. L REV. 250 (1989).

mEay
Caseof the Under-AgedPresident, 84
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Sections Two and Three, which address the composition of the
Congress: a House to be composed of members chosen by the people
of the "States" and a Senate to be composed of members from each
"State." The District of Columbia is not a "State." To Professor Raskin,
however, this reading of the Constitution is an overly "literal and
pinched," a "straighgacketed" reading of an "ambiguous" phrase.
In assessing Professor Raskin's argument, which apparently has been
endorsed by the legal officers of the District of Columbia, I am also
reminded of another constitutional argument that I heard several years
ago in which some opponents of a proposed constitutional amendment
restricting abortion contended that the amendment violated the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Never mind that this would
have been the first unconstitutional amendment in our country's
history, what such a mindset illustrates is the propensity, reflected also
in Professor Raskin's initiative, to identify a single constitutional value,
elevate it to a status of first among equals, and then subordinate before
it all competing constitutional values.
The Professor instructs us that the language of Article I, concerning
the nexus between congressional representation and the "States," must
be "informed" by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yes, I agree that equal protection is a fundamental
constitutional value, but so is the value of federalism, so is the value of a
written constitution delimiting the powers of government, and so is the
concept that principles sometimes need to be balanced and placed in
some equilibrium in the establishment of a workable, constitutional
republic.
Why the meaning of the word "State" in Article I must be "informed"
by the principle of equal protection, as opposed to being "informed" by
the principles of federalism, or perhaps "informed" by nothing other
than a dictionary is utterly unclear, except that this leads to the results
that Professor Raskin would prefer.
In this single-minded pursuit of his own favorite constitutional
principle (and again, I think it is a fine one, too), I would respectfully
suggest that Professor Raskin pays little regard to other principles
which-perhaps inconveniently-also undergird our Constitution, not
the least of which is what Justice Marshall described in Marbuy v.
Madison as the "greatest improvement" of all of our political
institutions-a written constitution, unchangeable by ordinary means."'
Indeed, Professor Raskin also divines in support of his proposal an

110. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (determining that the
Constitution is the paramount law of the nation, and any legislative act repugnant to it, is void).
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assortment of new constitutional principles that appear nowhere in
James Madison's Constitution. For example, he invokes the "norms of
the Constitution," including what he describes as the principles of an
"equal part in political life," an "equal stake in government," "equal
citizenship," and "equal respect," most of which appear highlighted in
his article as if they had come directly from the Federalist Papers.
Now lest I be misunderstood, let me acknowledge that these are all
very admirable concepts, they all describe political science ideals, and
perhaps they represent goals toward which our society ought to aspire.
But they are not constitutional standards, and they are not properly
invoked in a court of law, because they simply are not part of our
Constitution.
Yes, "equal citizenship" may be a worthy, general principle of
government, but it is a principle represented only imperfectly in our
Constitution because there are other worthy principles as well.
We do not mandate uniform voter registration laws under he
principle of "equal citizenship" because federalism is also an important
consideration; we do not prohibit wealthy candidates from outspending
their less well-endowed opponents under the principle of "equal
citizenship" because free speech is also an important consideration; and
we do not forbid the Federal Government from restricting the political
participation rights of its employees under the principle of "equal
citizenship" because the integrity of the governmental processes is also
an important consideration. In other words, there are competing
principles with equal protection that the Constitution, and I believe
most Americans, also consider to be important.
Now if Professor Raskin wants to seek to elevate his own principles of
government to constitutional status, or if he wants to seek to ensure that
these principles always trump other principles and provisions of the
Constitution, more power to him.
When he is done with the matter of District of Columbia
representation, he may also want to embark upon eliminating the
electoral college, the equal representation of the states in the Senate,
the constitutional amendment process, and indeed a Union in which
the rights of citizens are respected differently by the different states.
The District of Columbia could have sought to amend the Constitution
to provide the District with representation "as if' it were a State; sought
to amend the Constitution to provide the District with actual statehood;
sought to amend the Constitution by repealing the Twenty-third
Amendment; or sough t retrocession of parts of the District. They have
chosen not to undertake these efforts because they are judged to be
politically unattainable. That is, their pursuit of a democratic process,
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which is not a part of the Constitution, has been frustrated by the real
democratic processes of the Constitution.
So, in the modem manner, they are now seeking to replace the
decisions of the representative branches with those of a federal judge.
Whether they will succeed in finding a judge who is prepared to say
that, with respect to Article I, "State," does not mean "State," before
they find ajudge who will consider imposing sanctions for this abuse of
the judicial process, is anyone's guess. In particular, it is disappointing
that the leadership of the nation's capital should accord so little respect
to the language of our "supreme law," which brought both them and
their country into being.
The District's brief is a policy argument disguised as a constitutional
argument. While such policy is, in many respects, a compelling one,
the litigation itself is not. We see here the constitutional kitchen sink, a
veritable string-cite of constitutional allusions, invoked on behalf of
Professor Raskin's litigation-racial gerrymandering and apartheid, the
"badges and incidence" of slavery, the right to travel, poll taxes,
intentional discrimination, one person, one vote, the Fourteenth
Amendment, the First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Fifth Amendment, the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and much, much
more. Professor Raskin's article provides a dazzling whirlwind tour of
the Constitution, giving us not one, not two, not three, but six separate
arguments as to why representation of the District is compelled.
To all of this, I can only repeat: first, Article I, Section Two limits
representation in the House to members chosen by the people of the
"States"; second, that Article I, Section Three and the Seventeenth
Amendment limit representation in the Senate to members chosen
from the "States"; third, that the Twenty-third Amendment enables the
District to participate in presidential elections only "as if' it were a
"State"; and fourth, that Article V provides that no "State" shall ever be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, something that almost
certainly would be accomplished by allowing suffrage in that body to a
non"State." Article V preserves forever the federal aspect of the
national legislature against future nationalizing impulses. If all of this
language is insufficiently clear, then I can only suggest that the Framers
were remiss because they should have appended to their constitutional
language, "and we really mean all of this," and because they failed to
add several exclamation marks to the end of their work.
The original purposes of the "Seat of Government" Clause were
several: (a) to ensure that the national government could provide for
its own security and not to have to appeal for assistance to local
authorities; (b) to ensure that no state would be perceived as the first
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among equals by virtue of having within its boundaries the nation's
capital; and (c) to avoid what George Mason described as a "provincial
tincture" to the deliberations of the Congress"'-in other words, to
ensure that the national government was independent of the statesjust
as the states were to be independent of the national government.
Taken together, these demonstrated the "indispensable necessity" (in
Madison's words)
of a "seat of government" separate and distinct from
2
the States."
More recently, the unique status of the District has been justified on
the grounds that the District is the symbol of our nation, both to our
own citizens and to the world, and that its maintenance and security
ought not to be left to what is essentially a local government.
While reasonable people can differ on the current merits of these
various rationales for the District of Columbia-Professor Raskin, for
example, describes the District's status as "obsolescent"--such
differences are not a proper basis for circumventing the procedures for
change contained within the written Constitution. Indeed, I would
respectfully suggest that the current debate is more about
jurisprudential and constitutional probity than it is about the
substantive merits of according representation to residents of the
District. This is made particularly clear when Professor Raskin speaks
approvingly of the need to "keep faith with the evolving meaning of
constitutional concepts." Clearly, adherence to the "original meaning"
of the constitutional concept of statehood will not suffice here.
Finally, let me say that I am cognizant that Professor Raskin, without
doubt a highly distinguished scholar, has identified several decisions of
the Court which suggest that, for some statutory and perhaps even
some constitutional purposes, the word "State" may be broad enough to
encompass the District of Columbia. Whatever the merits of these
decisions, they are exceedingly narrow; they have operated almost
exclusively to sustain Congress' authority to legislate for the District
under Article I, not to compel the Congress to do anything; and they
have focused upon policies, in which there is little practical reason to
distinguish between the states and the District of Columbia. In
particular, the Court has refused to interpret "State" to include the
District even with respect to the principal statute used to enforce the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, much less for purposes of
the Amendment itself. It is beyond imagining that the cases cited by
Professor Raskin will persuade the Court that the Connecticut

111.
112.

SeeATroRNEYGEN. REP., supranote 90, at55 (remarks of George Mason).
SeeTHEFEDERALsrNo. 43, at288 (James Madison) a. Cooke ed., 1961).
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Compromise-which was at the heart of our Constitution and which
has defined American federalism for more than two centuries-ought
to be reversed and that the United States should now come to be what
one U.S. Senator has described as the "United States and Other
Assorted Things of America."
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is understandable why advocates of voting
representation for the District of Columbia would feel frustrated by the
various constitutional barriers to its achievement. Nevertheless, for the
reasons that I have set forth, I believe that the pending litigation is illadvised and, if successful, would distort the plain meaning of our
supreme law. While District of Columbia reidents share all of the
essential characteristics of citizens of the states, the District of Columbia
itself does not share the essential characteristics of the states. While the
equal protection principle compels that citizens of the District be
represented in some manner in the national legislature, the federal
principle compels that they do so only as citizens of a bona fide state.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR BUTLER: Good afternoon. I am going to make three
points about the right to vote in the District of Columbia.
First, I am going to discuss the importance of having a place at the
table. Second, I am going to discuss how a court might choose between
the various competing values that Judge Markman discussed. Third,
and this is a warning, I am going to discuss race and the District of
Columbia.
I should get to the part about race in about seven minutes if anybody
wants to leave. First, the importance of a place at the table: why is it
worth our time and our energy to fight for one or two votes in a 100
person body, or for one full vote in a body of over 400 members?
The best evidence is the consequences of not having a place at the
table. This is how they do us when we are not there. "They" means the
Senate. "We" refers to the citizens of the District of Columbia.
How they do us is they expose the petty democracy that we think we
enjoy as ajoke, a whim, a munificence that exists only at their pleasure.
We believe that we have a city council, and we believe that we have the
right of self-governance. But sometimes Congress makes it plain that
that our rights are as transparent as the worn flag that flies over the
District building.
There are a number of examples. Think of fifteen years ago when
"We the People" determined that we didn't want to criminalize
consenting sexual relations between adults, including when those adults
happened to be members of the same gender.
Some members of Congress were not particularly pleased with that
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exercise of self-governance, and so they did something that they
wouldn't have the power to do in any of the jurisdictions that they
represent. They reversed the will of the people, and Congress
summarily dismissed the law.
Or think of a few years ago when a senator's aide was tragically
murdered. The Senator believed that the accused person should
receive the death penalty. There was no death penalty in the District of
Columbia at the time.
"We the People," in our considered judgment, had decided that we
didn't believe our government should punish its citizens by killing
them. The Senator thought differently, and he forced a public
referendum on the issue in which the people soundly defeated the
death penalty.
The Senate doesn't take no for an answer, at least not as an answer
from "We the People" of the District of Columbia. At least two senators
have indicated that if we don't change our minds, then they will dictate
us a death penalty.
I could go on and on: school vouchers, adoptions, other family law
issues, and especially criminal law. It is telling that several of these
examples involve the criminal law. Congress has been especially heavy
handed in that area of law and politics. They have recently forced the
District of Columbia City Council to adopt federal sentencing
provisions for our cities when we already have the toughest sentencing
laws in the country.
The result of that heavy handedness is that over fifty percent of the
young black men in our city are under criminal justice supervision right
now. In the capital of the freest nation in the world, over half of the
young black men are either in prison, on probation or parole, or
awaiting trial.
The citizens of this capital cannot elect judges or a prosecutor. We
cannot appoint judges or a prosecutor. We don't even have ultimate
say about the laws that punish us most severely. So that is how they do
us. That is the consequence of not having a place at the table.
Now the congressional power that allows them to do us originates in
the Constitution, and that power wouldn't necessarily change even if
the principle of, one person, one vote, was respected. But at least D.C.
would have a place at the table.
If we had a seat at the table, we could horse trade with the big boys
and girls. This is an especially important power in the Senate. But look
at the influence of small states, like our neighbor West Virginia. The
Senate is designed to ensure that the residents of smaller jurisdictions
in that body are not the victims of the tyranny of the majority.
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One other consequence of not having that place, another way they
do you: they even limit what you can hope for. They limit what you can
aspire to be in the petit democracy.
So if the mayor you elected asks his assistants to petition the Congress
for a vote, they tell him no, you can't do that. If the mayor asks his
assistant, his chief lawyer, to file suit because he believes that the lack of
representation is unconstitutional, they tell him no, you can't do that.
They pass a law against being uppity.
There is legislation pending in the House that would forbid the city
from spending any money on this litigation, litigation to secure our
voting rights.'1 3 We pay more local taxes in the District of Columbia
than citizens in forty states, and they don't even let us spend our money
the way we want to.
There is nobody in the room with a vested interest to tell them how
low down that is. They make it very clear that they want to keep it that
way. It is like that episode on "All in the Family" when Edith gets fed up
finally with Archie's tyranny. She stands up for herself, and Archie says,
Edith, sit down and shut up, because he can. That is what the Senate
says to the District, because it can. But no lie can live forever. One day
Archie got his. I hope one day the Senate will get its. I hope.
Let me share a secret. I wasn't actually very optimistic about the
chances of the litigation, given the make-up of the federal courts these
days. But when I learned that the Senate was so scared of the lawsuit
that they didn't even want the Corporation Council to litigate it, I was
encouraged. So if they think that we have a fighting chance, why
shouldn't we?
The second point has to do with how do you interpret the
Constitution given these competing values that Judge Markman
mentioned? How should a court choose? Is the District Clause a
straighgacket.
One way a court might choose would be to think about the important
relationship between political participation and freedom and equality,
the bedrock principles of our form of government. When a group is
not fully enfranchised, they don't even have a chance to make their
case.
They don't even have the opportunity to bring their claim. As it is, in
the U.S. Senate, there is nobody with a vested interest in the District of
Columbia. There is nobody to even introduce a bill making the case
that it is unfair to tax people without representation.
113. See H.R. 4380, 105th Cong. (1998) (seeking to enforce a provision that would prohibit the
use of funds to be used in a civil action to provide the District with voting representation in
Congress).
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So the last time a bill was introduced to secure voting rights in the
District, it failed by a margin of two to one. If the Senate is not willing
to ensure full voting rights in the District of Columbia, then the courts
are all we have left. If the courts say they can't help us, where do we go?
So when we think about the value of democratic participation, I
respectfully suggest that the Constitution ought to be interpreted
consistent with this fundamental value.
To understand why, think, again, about that criminal law example.
We can't choose our judges or our prosecutors. We can't vote at least
for our federal representation. We are subject to laws that are
authorized by somebody else. And these laws lock up our citizens
longer than anyone else in the United States. That sounds like a colony
to me. "Is this America?" really is the key question. It doesn't sound
like America to me.
Certainly, there are other competing values. Yet, when I listened to
Judge Markman, his remarks reminded me of the debate about Brown
v. Board ofEducation. 4 There were various constitutional values at issue
in that case as well. One was the equal protection argument, or value,
that little Miss Brown endorsed.
Another was the value of freedom of association. Some legal scholars
argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown privileged equal
protection of the little girl over the right of white people not to
associate with black people. Those were values. The Court chose one
value over another. Thank God. But some academic critics faulted the
Court, because it failed to articulate some neutral basis for privileging
one value over another value.
One final point on the issue of how a court decides a case. I'm what
you call a legal realist, and I wonder how many of you are. You can
know whether you are or not by answering this question.
Is there anyone who really believes that the way a court will decide
this issue is by looking at Article I, Section Three and interpreting the
text? I probably shouldn't say this at a law school, but the fact that I am
speaking at a law school is no reason to leave my common sense out of
this.
I don't think that that is the only way or the main way the courts
decide cases. I think a lot of court decisions are policy decisions. Or to
use Judge Markman's phrase, I think a lot of court decisions are policy
decisions disguised as law. The legal argument is about whether the
District is enough like a state to elect representatives to the federal
legislature. If the court wants to accept Professor Raskin's fine
114.

Se347US.483 (1954).
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argument, it can.
The last point, very quickly: race and the District of Columbia. The
District would be the only majority African American jurisdiction
represented in the Senate. Dare we consider the relationship of the
denial of one person, one vote in the District of Columbia to other
historical efforts to exclude African Americans from exercising their

franchise?
What is the relationship of taxation without representation to the poll
tax and to the grandfather clause and to the literacy test and to the all

white primary and to the gerrymandered districts and to the current
assault on the Voting Rights Act?
The lesson of history is that there has always been strong opposition
to African Americans exercising the franchise. The last time there was a
significant black presence in the Senate was 100 years ago during
Reconstruction. White violence was the main tactic employed to end
black power in the Senate. They hanged black people who tried to
vote. The tactic was very successful. Since Reconstruction, there has
never been more than one African American in the Senate."!;
I am not suggesting that people who are opposed to voting rights in
the District are racist, not necessarily. But I am saying they at least
ought to be concerned about the company that they keep. They have
some friends in low places.
All we want, Martin Luther King said, is what you wrote on paper.
What is written on the paper of the American democracy is an idea of
freedom and an idea of self-governance that is embodied by the
principle of one person, one vote. It is part of the American Dream.
deferred. Does it
Langston Hughes asked what happens to a dream
6
explode?"
it
does
or
sun,
the
in
fester like a raisin
The dream is festering in the District of Columbia right now. One
day it will explode.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Professor Kurland, I have
been told you get an extra three minutes for this, in the interests of
equity and equal protection.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: It is nice to know that the people running
the debate are interested in equity because I thinkJudge Markman and
myself are interested in equity as well.
My name is Adam Kurland. I am a professor of law at Howard
University, and I also want to thank American University for putting on
this symposium, which touches on some very important legal,
115. One hundred years later, in 1999, there are none.
116. See Langston Hughes, Harlem, in CROSSING THE DANGER WATER: THREE HUNDRED YEARS
OFAFRICAN-AMERICANWRrrING 508 (Diedre Mullane ed., 1993).
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philosophical issues-legal, at least, in the sense that the topic deserves
discussion in a lawjournal. I am not convinced that it really belongs in
a court of law.
When I get to minute eight or nine of my discussion, I will try to
directly address what appears to be the topic of debate for this session:
must Congress end the disenfranchisement of the District of Columbia?
It is something that really was only briefly touched on by Professor
Raskin.
The topic is the second part of the trilogy concerning what is the
appropriate remedy concerning the disenfranchisement of voting rights
of the citizens of the District, whether it be a lawsuit, congressional
remedy, or a constitutional amendment.
I'll get to that in a minute. I want to spend a minute talking about
how difficult and how potentially dangerous it is for me even to be
speaking here today.
I have done this before with the D.C. statehood issue, and I have had
the pleasure of being grilled by Representative Norton at a
congressional subcommittee hearing, so I am used to this. I thought,
this is like the Washington Generals and the Harlem Globetrotters, that
you are being sent out to put on a good show and lose.
We have six people, technically, judging the debate. But I can guess
that in the larger audience, regardless of what Judge Markman and I
say, that we will be like the Washington Generals-just kind of
avalanched under another Harlem Globetrotter victory.
I find it ironic because I am certain that the lawsuit will fail. That
doesn't make me an opponent of democracy in any sense of the term. I
just think that the lawsuit will lose. To the extent that there is any
political gain from the defeated lawsuit, to the extent that it provides
impetus on Capitol Hill for anything, that is a different matter.
Something else struck me. In reading Professor Raskin's draft of his
article that was sent to me, I am identified on page thirty-seven as a
statehood opponent. NowJamie and I are friends. But the only thing
that I could imagine as to why he would put that in print is because of
an article I wrote in 1992 in the George Washington Law Review entitled,
"Partisan Rhetoric, Constitutional Reality, and Political Responsibility:
The Troubling Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C.
' 7
Statehood by Simple Legislation."
The sole point of the article concerned the constitutional
inconvenience of getting around the Twenty-third Amendment, which,
117. Adam H. Kurland, PartisanRhetoric ConstitutionalReality, and PoliticalResponsibility: The
TroublingConstitutionalConsequences ofAchievngD.G Statehood by Simple Legislation, 60 GEO. wAsH. L.
REV. 475 (1992).
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after all, was the constitutional amendment that provided the District's
participation in presidential elections and the electoral college.
When the statehood scenario was being debated, the theory was, wait
a minute, we are going to shrink the District down. We'll make the
federal District of Columbia the little enclave where the President lives
and maybe the homeless in Lafayette Park, and we'll turn the rest of it
into New Columbia.
The article basically says that okay, that is fine and good. If you want
to shrink the District of Columbia, that is fine. Voting rights, equal
representation, I cherish those values, and that is very important. But I
said, wait a minute, if you do that, that little shrunken seat of
government will be entitled to the three electoral votes under the
Twenty-third Amendment.
You want to give Chelsea Clinton, I don't know if she is eighteen yet,
but she is out in California. I don't know what her voting residence is.
But the Clintons don't have a house in Arkansas. They can easily
change their voting address to the District of Columbia. The people
who live in the White House could get three electoral votes. That is just
a constitutional, inconvenient fact.
So Professor Raskin and others said, no, no, no, we don't want to
have to hassle with repealing the Twenty-third Amendment. We'll just
delete it by saying that we will just get the same Congress that will pass
statehood or get the statehood ball rolling-and just delete the
technical statutory provisions that bring the electoral college into
existence in the District. I mean, the technical statute-I don't have the
cite to it."'
But there is a statute that says the District gets its three electoral votes,
and it is winner take all, so on and so forth." 9 So the theory of the
"statehood by legislation" proponents was, in essence, we will get rid of
the Twenty-third Amendment, a cherished voting right that gives the
constitutional rights of the citizens to vote for President-we'll just wipe
it out by eliminating by legislation the statutes that bring the voting
rights of the Twenty-third Amendment into effect.Y
My position is that that is nonsense. The Twenty-third Amendment is

118. The current federal statute authorizing the District of Columbia to enact selection
procedures for its participation in the Electoral College is the Act of October 4, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-389,75 Stat. 817 (1961). For a further discussion, seeKurland, supra note 117, at 487 & n.42.
119. See D.C. Code § 1-1314(a) (2) (1992) (providing that the presidential candidate receiving
the highest number of votes is entitled to all of District's electoral votes).
120. See Kurland, supra note 117, at 486-87 & nA2 (citing articles by Professors Philip Schrag
and Peter Raven-Hansen endorsing the concept that the Twenty-third Amendment is not selfexecuting and that the District's participation in electoral college and presidential elections could
be repealed by statute).

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:589

a significant constitutional barrier. It mandates that the seat of
government of the United states, no matter how small, is entitled to
participate in presidential elections through the electoral college. You
just can't get around it. You have to repeal it by constitutional
amendment. Anytime anyone suggests that a constitional amendment
is required for any purpose relating to D.C. statehood, the odds are
good you will be branded an "opponent" of statehood.
I find it ironic that Professor Raskin, in championing this theory of
equal protection, privileges and immunities, so on and so forth, this
whole specter of inclusive voting rights, is so willing, when it suits his
purposes, to throw the Twenty-third Amendment overboard when it
becomes an inconvenience.
The other point that I want to make before I get onto the main
subject at hand is that I speak at peril, tongue in cheek. When I
reviewed a copy of the lawsuit, I noticed that one of the12 named
plaintiffs is Pat Swygert, who is President of Howard University. '
So I am the only person on the panel who, in the exercise of
academic freedom and free speech, is saying something that might be
construed as mocking the person who in some sense signs my paycheck.
Now President Swygert is a firm advocate of free speech and of
academic freedom, and I know these proceedings are being taped and
videotaped for posterity. So let there be no question President Swygert,
I am in no way implying that you don't favor free speech and academic
freedom.
In any event, I come at this whole issue in an odd way. I am, as they
like to say on CNN or MSNBC, one of those ubiquitous former federal
prosecutors. My academic interests are mostly criminal law and
criminal procedure. But I was a history major and loved the electoral
college. I became involved in the statehood issue as an academic topic
solely as it related to the Twenty-third Amendment issues with regard to
the electoral college.
Now as a former prosecutor in dealing with this debate, what
prosecutors sometimes do when they are trying to make their closing
arguments, they listen to everything that was said before in defense
closing arguments, and to try to show you how ridiculous and off base
the defense position is with regard to what they are asserting.
I know that these are the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. But a prosecutor
would have listened to both the first panel and this panel and said wait
a minute. We are talking about voting representation and the
121. See Alexander v. Daley, No. 98, GV-02187 (D.D.C.),
President of Howard University, as plaintiff).

48 (listing H. Patrick Swgert,
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constitutional issues.
But what I have heard from my opponents? Abe Lincoln, the
impeachment of President Clinton, Stokely Carmichael, land reform,
Rock Creek Park, willful negligence, straigh acket, 1968 riots,
Washington Post,and Edith Bunker and "All in the Family."
Now what do these things have to do with the explicit constitutional
commands concerning this not very complicated issue that the
Constitution and the principles of federalism say that in order to be
represented in Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate,
you have got to be a State? It is a simple as that.
Mark Plotkin laughed. I talked to him at the break for a minute.
The summary of what this case is all about is going to be decided in-I
don't know if it will be two or three paragraphs, but it could be resolved
that simply.
The judge's law clerk might be interested in some of the
constitutional issues. But it is going to be resolved on that basis, that
the proper forum is not the courts, not even Congress, but the
constitutional amendment process.
So the short answer to the topic of this debate, must Congress end
the disenfranchisement of the District of Columbia, the answer is it
can't. Congress can set the statehood process in motion and the wheels
in motion to grant statehood and then go through all of the other
constitutional obstacles on that basis. But Congress can't pass a law that
says that the residents of the District get votes for Congress and votes for
Senator.
I'll spend a minute talking about that in a little while. I wanted to
add one other thing that goes along with the inconvenient
constitutional truths that Judge Markman spoke about. The District
Clause also says that Congress can exercise exclusive legislation in all
cases whatsoever over such district as made by cession of particular
states and acceptance by Congress, becomes the seat of government of
the United States.'2
So the District Clause itself makes it abundantly clear that the District
is not a state under the Constitution, in addition to all of the other
constitutional provisions which talk about "State," and the Twenty-third
Amendment that says the District gets its three electoral votes as if it
were a state.
But the District Clause itself differentiates the seat of government of
the United States as a district that is going to be created out of the
cession by particular states. The District of Columbia-or actually, that
122.

SeU.S. CONST. ar. L

§ 8, d.

17.
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isn't even the constitutional term. The constitutional term is, the "Seat
of Government" of the United States,'" where we are right now, is not a
state for the purposes of representation in the national legislature.
If that position is to be changed, and I agree that there are strong
philosophical, legal, and human rights arguments that say that the
situation needs to be changed, the redress is to amend this
inconvenient little thing called the Constitution.
I was talking with Professor Raven-Hansen before at the coffee this
morning. Maybe he'll have a comment on this later. But I asked him,
what he thinks about the chance of success of the lawsuit. He said, well,
it is probably going to lose in the political sense. I agree the law suit will
lose, and I believe this particular law suit should not be used to make a
political statement. Whether some lawsuits may be properly used for
political pui-poses is another matter. This particular lawsuit is a political
document that has redress in other more appropriate forums.
One of the panel members on the first panel said, well, if I was in the
Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office or the Department of Justice,
I might handle the case. That means some lawyer in the Justice
Department, and perhaps maybe some private counsel, time, money,
and effort is going to have to be expended responding to this lawsuit.
Again, when all is said and done, I take issue with Professor Bufler
here. This really isn't a situation of policy masquerading as law. There
are some terms in the Constitution that simply are not ambiguous.
There is the constitutional provision Judge Markman discussedthirty-five years old, maturity level.'24 Other people have argued that
you can't imprison a pregnant woman because the fetus, if it is a
person, has Fourteenth Amendment rights, and you are putting that
person in prison and so on and so forth.
That might be the stuff of constitutional parlor games, and even
some serious discussions in law review symposia. It really isn't the stuff
of a lawsuit I don't think the senators are concerned about losing the
lawsuit I think it is silly for them to try to micromanage to the extent
where they are going to say we are not going to let you have the money
to litigate the lawsuit
I think what that does is give more credit to the lawsuit than it
deserves, and it allows Professor Bufler to make a very plausible
argument that it seems that these guys must be afraid of something. I
think they are just overreacting, like they do on a lot of things, and they
want to make this a symbolic protest concerning what they believe is a
123.
124.

Seeid.
SeeU.S.CoNSr.art. II,§ 1, ci.5.
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waste of money on this lawsuit
Well again, the lawsuit is going to lose. It is going to lose because
there is no legal basis for the lawsuit. End of story.
Now with regard to-in my last two minutes here-the issue
concerning must Congress end the disenfranchisement of the District
of Columbia, there was some discussion in the first panel. Professor
Raskin does a terrific job in coming up with all sorts of strains of
constitutional cases which arguably support the position that he wants,
if you ignore that other strain of cases that the Supreme Court has
decided which says that voting rights are really not fundamental.
The answer to the question is that the reason why the Supreme Court
doesn't directly say that voting rights are fundamental is that the
structure of our federalism is set up in such a way that voting rights, to a
large degree-and they have been modified by other constitutional
amendments-come from the states.
Even the hallowed Fourteenth Amendment, if you take a look at the
language, did not talk about directly giving the rights to vote for
Congress. It basically said that, well, if you are going to-if you are
going to limit voting rights, it says the representatives will be
apportioned among the several states according to their respective
members. But when the right to vote in any election for president, the
choice of electors or representatives is denied or in any way abridged,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
of the number of such male citizens-so and so forth. So even the
Fourteenth Amendment recognized that if some states were going to
have restrictive voting rights, all it could do was essentially penalize
them by taking away representation, as opposed to saying that you had
to do something in a particular way. I think some loose ends need to be
tied up. Professor Raskin, in this article, 1 and Professor Raven-Hansen
as well, talk about voting rights for American citizens living abroad.2
If Congress can do that-American citizens living abroad, if they can
vote in congressional elections as if they still resided in their state of last
domicile, why can't Congress do the same thing to the representatives
of the District? I think that is one of the more difficult legal issues that

125. See Raskin, supranote 1, at 64 (arguing that Congress acted with a presumed indifference
or hostility to the rights of unpopular groups, by extending full voting rights to citizens living
abroad, while denying them to citizens of the District).
126. See Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionalityof D.C. Statehoodv 60 GEo. WASH. L REv. 160,
185-86 (1991) (arguing that if Congress has the power to enact legislation allowing citizens residing
abroad to vote in federal elections, it at least has comparable authority to enact legislation allowing
District residents to vote in a New Columbia elections for federal office).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-i (1988) (directing the states to provide procedures for people who
live overseas to vote); see also id. § 1973ff-6 (defining "states" as including the District of Columbia).
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needs to be addressed. I think it is distinguishable.
There are a couple of court cases that Professor Raskin cites in which
the distinction has been made between citizens moving from place to
place within the United States, as opposed to moving abroad where
they don't get voting rights in their new country until they become
citizens.2 8
So there are some legitimate legal issues that need to be thought of
with regard to that. On the other hand, giving District citizens the right
to vote in Maryland doesn't really solve all of the issues that we are
talking about here because the body politic in the District of Columbia
isn't merely an appendage of Montgomery County.
So I'm not sure that would be a satisfactory response, even if
Congress could do it. I don't think they could. The Evans case'--one
of the members of the Law Review ran out and got me a copy at my
request-was discussed in the first panel.
Evans makes it real clear that, with regard to the District and the
other federal enclaves--the situations are different in fundamental
ways.
Appellees in Evans clearly lived within the geographical
boundaries of the state of Maryland. The Court talked about how the
people residing on the NIH grounds had to get Maryland license plates
on their cars, send their children to Maryland public schools, and so on
and so forth.3
There is a difference in the District Clause. It is recognized in the
Evans v. Cornman case and in others, that there is a difference between
the seat of government of the United States and those other federal
enclaves that are within,other states.
My time is up. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR NILES (MODERATOR): Now I guess we have six
minutes from the first side, the D.C. voting rights side.
PROFESSOR RASKIN: I am afraid it is not enough merely to say that
the Constitution solves this problem, but then do no constitutional
analysis to explain why or how.
If we are serious about the Constitution, let's take the Constitution
seriously. Let's analyze what it says; let's analyze the way the Supreme
Court has interpreted the document as a whole.
Now the Twenty-third Amendment, which Professor Kurland
discusses, is perfectly consistent with what we are saying.
128. See, eg., Igaruta de la Rosa v. United States, 842 F. Supp. 607, 611-12 (D.P.R. 1994)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
against due process and equal protection claims).
129. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
130. See i at 424-25.
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Our opponents say you can't treat the District as though it were a
state, except there is language in the Twenty-third Amendment itself
which says that for the purposes of presidential elections, the District
should be treated as if it were a state. This expresses what I find to be a
clear constitutional preference for voting in the District of Columbia, as
well as a textual indication that all of the treatment of the District as a
state is appropriate. Indeed, Congress treats the District as though it
were a state for essentially every other constitutional, statutory, and
programmatic purpose.
The reason that the text needs to be explicit for presidential elections
is precisely because of Professor Kurland's beloved electoral college,
which requires the organization of electoral college in each jurisdiction
that is going to be electing a president.
So how in any way does that refute the idea that one person, one vote
applies in the District of Columbia? The Twenty-third Amendment is a
floor, not a ceiling, and the Ninth Amendment makes it certain that the
enumeration of the right to vote in presidential elections may not be
construed to deny or disparage the right to vote in congressional
elections.
There is an interesting parallel with the Twenty-fourth Amendment,
which banned poll taxes in federal, but not state, elections. This was in
1964, but two years later the Court struck down the poll tax in state
elections, emphasizing that the historical meanings of that equal
protection do change. 3 ' Just as the Twenty-fourth Amendment
changed the meaning of equal protection, so did the Twenty-third
Amendment. Both Professor Kurland and Judge Markman say you
have got to be in a state to vote. On the contrary, Congress has
enfranchised millions of people who don't live within states (and are
not seen as state residents in state law) to vote through the Overseas
Citizens Voting Rights Act.
If you go back and you read the legislative history of the Overseas
Citizens Voting Rights Act, it is perfectly dear that Congress thought
there was a constitutional obligation to make certain that when people
leave the United States to go serve the country abroad, the way they
come to Washington to serve the Federal Government in some cases,
they continue to possess the right to vote, which is why millions of
Americans in all of the other continents of the world continue to enjoy
the right to vote that is denied to people who live on the mainland in
the District of Columbia.

131. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1996) (holding that state poll
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I don't find your attempt to wave off the Overseas Citizens Voting
Rights Act-by saying admittedly it is a difficult problem-remotely
convincing. If you have got to be physically within the state to vote, why
do millions of people get enfranchised in that way? Doesn't that cause
an equal protection problem?
Why is it that citizens who live on every other piece of federal
jurisdiction, every federal enclave, get the right to vote, but not people
who live within the federal jurisdiction that is the District of Columbia?
It does not make any sense. There is no rationality here.
Now several points fbr Judge Markman. First of all, being thirty-five
years old myself, I liked his point about the Constitution requiring that
you be thirty-five years old to be elected president. But it cuts
completely against his argument. Could Congress say that people who
were thirty-five years old and above in the District of Columbia can't
run for president? I think not. In other words, whether you are thirtyfive in D.C. or you are thirty-five in California, you have a right to run
for president.
We are talking about the literal terms of the
Constitution.
Their argument does not advance beyond what Professor Gardner
said this morning, which is he predicts that the government will say that
the whole case is solved by the word "States" in the Constitution.
Yet this fails to address the point that Congress treats the District as
though it were a state for more than 500 purposes, from highway funds
to selective service to education funds, for constitutional purposes, from
the right of people to sue each other across state lines, the Full Faith
and Guarantee Clause, the First Amendment, the Second Amendment,
the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and so on and so
32
forth.1
In fact, I challenge them to find other constitutional purposes
outside of voting and representation where the District of Columbia is
not treated as though it were a state. So the question is not how can it
be treated like a state in the case of voting representation, but why
should it not be treated like a state for the purposes of voting
representation when it is treated, and functions, like a state for almost
every other purpose.
Now Judge Markman makes a serious point: what about denial of
equal suffrage of the states in the Senate? But every precedent we have
on that says all this provision means is that you can't give one of the
states more senators than another state. That is the way that that has
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always been interpreted."3
He also says that the District Clause intended to create a district
which will be under control of Congress so Congress could govern the
city. We are not challenging that premise. Federal representation for
District residents and federal control over the District are not
incompatible.
Congress can close Pennsylvania Avenue even if
everybody in Washington doesn't want it dosed. Congress clearly has
that authority under the District Clause.
But because of the principle of popular sovereignty, democratic
control, one person, one vote, the people of the District of Columbia
have got to be represented in Congress, even if they are out-voted 435
to one. But Washingtonians still, as Professor Butler says, have to have a
seat at the table.
In the final analysis, the argument reminds me of what President
Lincoln and Daniel Webster used to talk about, as the political and
constitutional philosophy that tried to trap African American slaves and
freeze injustice permanently. Here is what Webster said:
They have him in this prison house. They have searched his person,
and they have left no prying instruments with him. One after
another, they have dosed the heavy iron doors upon him. Now they
have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of 100 keys which can never
be unlocked without the concurrence of every key, the keys in the
hands of 100 different men, and they are scattered to 100 different
and distant places. No one is responsible for the injustice. They
stand musing as to what invention in all of the dominions of mind
and matter can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape
more complete than it is.'-"
Our adversaries here would like to turn the Constitution into a
straitacket, a "prison house." But our Constitution is not that; it is a
freedom charter, the expression of our nation's enduring commitment
to democratic self-government.
JUDGE MARKMAN: Well, judging by Professor Raskin's rebuttal, I
have failed to persuade him. I am disappointed about that. Let me
make several random points, if I may. First, as I suggested in my initial
remarks, while District of Columbia citizens do share the same essential
characteristics of the citizens of the states, the problem is that the
District itself as a political entity does not share the essential
characteristics of the states.
This is what is critical under our
Constitution.
More importantly, the District of Columbia lacks the independence
133.
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of the States. It lacks the sovereignty of the states. It lacks the interest
in the preservation of federalist values of the states. Also, the District is
far more homogenous in the employment of its people and in its
economic base than any of the fifty states. It has a single industry, which
is government. It has a size, geography, and population, which is unlike
the states. It has a financial dependence upon the national government
which is unlike the states.
So again I emphasize it is not the characteristics of the people of the
District, but the political characteristics of the District of Columbia itself
that make it inappropriate to be accorded representation without
statehood. Now if we were to grant it statehood, of course, this would
be an entirely different constitutional question.
Second, let me also note-and I understand there might be
considerable disagreement with this-that while District of Columbia
residents are not represented in a traditional sense in the Congress, I
would submit there is at least an argument to be made that, in reality,
they have at least as much effective influence in the affairs of the nation
as, say, the citizens of Des Moines or Dubuque.
I say this based on the influence that the District of Columbia has on
members of Congress effected through their newspapers, effected
through the fact that members themselves live in their midst, effected
by their proximity to Congress, effected by the nature of the
employment of its citizens, and effected by the fact that Congress has
several committees devoted entirely to its affairs.
I quote in this respect from James Madison, who said, "Those who are
most adjacent to the seat of legislation in the seat of government will
always possess advantages over others and earlier knowledge of the laws,
a greater influence in enacting them, better opportunities for
anticipating them, and a thousand other circumstances will give a
superiority to those who are not thus situated." 35
Third, with respect to Professor Butler, we can all argue about
competing values of government and what kind of equilibrium ought to
be struck between these values and which are more and which are less
important. However, Let me emphasize that the gist of my remarks is
not that of competing values.
Rather, the issue is that of text. Article I, Section Three, Article I,
Section Four, Article V and the Twenty-third Amendment are not
"ambiguous," with all due respect to Professor Raskin, nor do I think it
is a "pinched" interpretation of these provisions to say that, "States"
mean "States."
135.
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This is ultimately what I am focusing on-not on the matter of
competing values where I might draw a slightly different balance than
Professor Butler, but rather on the black and white language of the
Constitution.
In particular, I strongly disagree with Professor Butler's suggestion
that no one really believes that a court will decide the issue of this
lawsuit on the basis of the language in Article I of the Constitution.
Well, of course I do. I would hope that, as law students, all of you would
operate under this premise. *Ifwe don't accept this premise, then we
should be considerably concerned about the direction in which our
legal system is headed. I think Professor Butler's is a rather cynical view.
In fact, ifjudges deciding this controversy do not decide it on the basis
of the express language of Article I and the other provisions of the
Constitution that have been cited, then they are clearly violating their
oath of office.
Finally, let me suggest that of all people who are dependent upon a
written, certain, clear Constitution-and our history should have
demonstrated this-it is the racial and ethnic minorities in this country.
Now I do not think this is a racial issue, although the issue of race has
been repeatedly injected into this. From 1800 until 1950, a majority of
the people living in the District were white, and we had the same
constitutional arrangements for the District that we do today.
But, if you do want to look at this issue through a racial prism, then
there is no group of individuals in our society who are more dependent
upon respect for a clear, consistent constitution, and more dependent
upon judges interpreting that Constitution in a faithful and honorable
manner, as opposed to transforming it in response to highly creative
arguments,' than racial and ethnic minorities.
Thank you very much.
HOST: Again, I would like to thank our panelists and our debaters
for that very interesting approach to this issue. I know that many of you
have questions and comments regarding their arguments. We will have
the opportunity to discuss those in our second panel discussion after
lunch.
A lunch has been prepared for us, and it is available in the dining
hall directly past the doors. At that time, Professor Raskin will
introduce our keynote speaker.
(Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken.)

136.

S

ag., Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).

